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Abstract
This paper analyses the e¤ects on private consumption from an
increase in productive and unproductive public spending. A new
Keynesian model incorporating price and wage rigidities, monetary
policy and various scal rules is developed and estimated, using
Bayesian techniques, to capture the key cyclical characteristics of
the US economy. We nd that price and wage rigidities along with
a positive shock to the part of public spending that is productive
are su¢ cient to boost private consumption. Moreover, we show that
this initial positive reaction of private consumption is adequate to
create a positive present value consumption multiplier for more than
ve years. Finally, we show that our main results remain robust to
changes in the monetary rule and the various methods of decit
nancing.
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1. Introduction
The recent nancial and sovereign debt crisis has pivoted the attention of
the policy-makers towards scal policy. In the United States, the introduc-
tion of the new scal package to stimulate demand, mainly through higher
spending and lower taxes, according to The 2015 Long-Term Budget Out-
look of the Congressional Budget O¢ ce, has lead to a decit of about
$5.6 trillion over the period 2008-2012, leading to a debt to output ratio
of about 74% in 2015.1 The projection over the next 25 years for the U.S.
is to increase federal spending to about 25.3% as share of output, which
is signicantly higher compared to the 50 years average of 20.1%, with a
more gradual increase on the revenue side compared to spending.2
Therefore, under this environment, determining the e¤ect of the increase
in government spending to the economy is of paramount importance. In
particular, in this paper we examine the e¤ect of changes to productive and
unproductive government spending on private consumption. Accordingly,
we aim at identifying which part of government spending could lead to an
increase of private consumption. In this regard, we contribute to previous
economic literature by adopting a new Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic Gen-
eral Equilibrium (DSGE) model with price rigidities and monetary policy
which includes: i) productive and unproductive government spending; ii)
distortive and lump-sum taxation; iii) several scal policy rules.
It is widely accepted that an expansionary scal policy through higher
government spending will increase output. However, there is no consensus
regarding the e¤ects of changes to government spending on private con-
sumption. In particular, the standard neoclassical approach predicts that
an increase in government spending will cause a decline in private con-
sumption due to the anticipation of higher debt nancing taxes, leading to
a negative wealth e¤ect. On the other hand, new Keynesian models are able
to reproduce the crowding-in e¤ect on private consumption under certain
assumptions, e.g. regarding the share of non-Ricardian agents (where their
consumption equals their after-tax labour income) and price rigidities.
Moreover, there is a vast empirical literature on the impact on private
1This is the highest level of debt for the US in the post WWII period.
2For more details see The 2015 Long-Term Budget Outlookof the Congressional
Budget O¢ ce.
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consumption of a positive government spending shock. Most of the em-
pirical literature utilises structural VAR models with various identication
schemes. These papers nd a positive correlation between private consump-
tion and government spending, but they do not agree on the magnitude of
the e¤ect (i.e. Blanchard and Perotti, 2002 and Galí et al., 2007). Ac-
cordingly, our work presents three main contributions with respect to this
literature: rstly, we use a dataset that allows us to decompose total public
spending into productive and unproductive government expenditures; sec-
ondly, we estimate our model for a relative long sample period (more than
40 years) at quarterly frequency covering the most recent period; lastly, we
use Bayesian methods in order to estimate the model parameters including
the scal rules.
There has also been a strand of literature that examines the e¤ects of
government spending on economic growth. On the one hand, neoclassical
growth models, like Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), show that government
spending does not have any impact on growth. On the other hand, en-
dogenous growth models, like Barro (1990) and King and Rebelo (1990),
show that scal variables have an impact on growth. The empirical re-
sults are rather inconclusive (i.e. Stokey and Rebelo, 1995 and Kneller
et al., 1999) with more recent papers suggesting a non-linear relationship
between government spending and economic growth (Asimakopoulos and
Karavias, 2016). However, the focus of this paper is on the e¤ect of higher
government spending on the level of consumption and not on its long-run
growth.
In a similar work to ours, Leeper et al. (2010) emphasize on the impor-
tance of several scal rules in the U.S. economy. In particular, they use a
real business cycle model with productive government spending to assess
the e¤ects of various delays on the implementation of pre-announced public
spending. They also show the importance of debt nancing and its impli-
cations to the economy suggesting that lump-sum taxes/transfers do not
have a signicant e¤ect on consumption.3 Therefore, their ndings suggest
that the introduction of non-Ricardian agents is not a necessary condition
3In this regard a vast empirical literature suggests that the assumptions made on
how the increased government spending is nanced matters for the response of private
consumption and output (i.e. Mountford and Uhlig 2009 and Leeper et al., 2010).
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causing a positive response in private consumption. On the contrary, the
assumption of a su¢ ciently productive government capital may lead to the
crowding-in e¤ect on private consumption.
Galí et al. (2007) show the importance of incorporating rule-of-thumb
consumers together with price rigidities, to generate a crowding-in e¤ect
in consumption following a positive shock to government spending. More
specically, the channel through which the crowding-in e¤ect is realised
comes from: rstly, the fact that non-Ricardian agents cannot react to
higher future taxes, due to the increased government spending, mitigating
the negative impact on aggregate demand; and secondly price rigidities that
minimise the negative impact on wage rates. Both of these e¤ects lead to
higher labour income that boosts the consumption of the non-Ricardian
households leading to the crowding-in e¤ect.4
Similarly to Galí et al. (2007), Linnemann and Schabert (2003) show
that price rigidities alone are not su¢ cient to generate a positive reaction
in private consumption following a positive public spending shock. In ad-
dition, Ravn et al. (2006) show that price rigidities together with deep
habits can replicate the empirically relevant positive reaction of private
consumption.
However, in this paper, following Baxter and King (1993), Ambler and
Paquet (1996) and Linnemann and Schabert (2006), we argue that the
combination of price rigidities with productive public spending can create a
positive reaction in private consumption under an increase in the productive
public spending.5
In a di¤erent work, Linnemann (2006) shows that, under a specic non-
separable utility function with a su¢ ciently strong link between marginal
utility of consumption and labour, it is possibile to nd a crowding-in
e¤ect on private consumption from an increase in government spending,
even if the latter is not productive. The strong assumption made by this
author is that a lump-sum tax is residually determined via the government
4Galí et al. (2007) only allow for a lump-sum tax/transfer and not individual labour
and capital taxes with scal rules.
5Baxter and King (1993) and Ambler and Paquet (1996) implement a neoclassical
model without debt. In addition, Linnemann and Schabert (2006) use a new Keynesian
model with a simple interest rate rule and debt is considered as a case study assuming
that it follows a rule and not together with various scal rules as we do. Moreover, none
of these papers performs a Bayesian estimation of their model.
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budget constrain, thus moving away from any use of debt and distortionary
taxation or even any kind of scal rules.
In addition, Forni et al. (2009) examine the spill-over e¤ects to the econ-
omy of three di¤erent types of government spending, among others. How-
ever, even though they incorporate Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents
and scal rules (only for the distortionary tax rates), they do not show any
signicant crowding-in e¤ect on consumption following a positive govern-
ment spending shock.
More recently, Coenen et al. (2012) show that the crowding-in e¤ect
on private consumption can be obtained only if both of the following as-
sumptions are present: rstly, government consumption enters the utility
function in a non-separable way; and secondly government and private
consumption are strong complements. When they drop either of the two
assumptions the crowding-in result disappears and the response of private
consumption is comparable to our model under a shock to the unproductive
government spending.
Finally, Kormilitsina and Zubairy (2016) are not able to reproduce the
crowding-in e¤ect on private consumption following a positive public spend-
ing shock in any of their estimated models that incorporate most of the
aforementioned features.
Therefore, taking the above into consideration, we would like to identify
which component of government spending has a positive e¤ect on private
consumption under a theoretical framework. Following the empirical work
of Kneller et al. (1999) and the more recent theoretical paper by Leeper
et al. (2010) we also split the overall government spending to productive
and unproductive. In particular, our distinction assumes that expenditures
with a substantial (physical or human) capital component are considered
as productive. On the hand, the major unproductiveexpenditure cat-
egory relates to social security expenditures. Accordingly, we estimate
di¤erent scal rules for the two types of government spending.
As a result, our theoretical model includes two separate channels through
which public expenditure a¤ect the economy: the productive government
spending which is included in the rmsproduction function; and the un-
productive government expenditure. We estimate our model with Bayesian
techniques and we avoid VAR identication problems faced by previous em-
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pirical papers investigating the e¤ects of government expenditure on the
economy (see Galí et al. 2007 and references therein). Moreover, in our
Bayesian estimation we allow for debt to be nanced via labour income
taxes, capital income taxes, lump-sum taxes and the two types of govern-
ment spending. Thus, we also deviate from the literature that assumes that
debt nancing takes place only through lump-sum taxes/transfers (see, for
example, Coenen and Straub, 2005 and Forni et al., 2009).
In this regard, our approach allows us to contribute to previous eco-
nomic literature by analysing di¤erent scal policy experiments. In par-
ticular, we assess the output and consumption multipliers under di¤erent
assumptions on: i) nancing methods; ii) public spending share in the
rmsproduction function; iii) speed of adjustment of di¤erent scal rules;
iv) di¤erent weights on output and ination in the monetary rule.
Our main ndings show that private consumption responds di¤erently
to productive and unproductive government shocks. In particular, we ob-
serve a di¤erent consumption behaviour when price rigidities are present
with respect to the standardneoclassical case. In the former case, the
stronger shift in the labour demand compared to labour supply and the high
ination lead to an increase in wage rates. This is su¢ cient to generate
a crowding-in e¤ect on private consumption. On the contrary, unproduc-
tive public spending exhibits a high persistence. In this case the labour,
capital and lump-sum taxes need to remain high, or keep increasing over
time. This implies a signicant crowding-out e¤ect on private consumption
because the persistent high taxes cause a signicant negative wealth e¤ect
on consumers.
Regarding the output present value multipliers, under the rigid and
exible economy, our results are in line with the range of values reported
in previous empirical studies. Interestingly, under the rigid economy, a
positive shock to productive spending has a positive e¤ect on the con-
sumption present value multipliers for at least ve years. Moreover, we
nd that in the long-run whether the government uses distortionary or
non-distortionary nancing methods signicantly matters. In particular,
di¤erent ways of nancing have distinct e¤ects on output and consumption
multipliers depending on whether the economy is rigid or exible. We also
show an immediate positive reaction of private consumption when produc-
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tive spending increases irrespective the method of debt nancing. Finally,
we nd that a less aggressive monetary policy implies lower nominal and
real interest rate weakening consumers incentives to postpone consump-
tion.
In the next section we briey discuss our new Keynesian DSGE model.
In section 3, we present the data used for the analysis and our Bayesian
estimates. In Section 4, we compare the impulse responses for productive
and unproductive government spending shocks. Section 5 provides the
results for consumption and output present value multipliers. In section
6 we present several robustness checks. Finally, section 7 concludes the
paper.
2. Theoretical Model
In this section we present our DSGE model assuming that there are two
di¤erent public expenditures, namely, productive and unproductive govern-
ment spending. We adopt a new Keynesian model in line with the paper of
Smets and Wouters (2007) extended in order to consider distortive taxes to
capital and labour incomes together with several scal policy rules. More-
over, we assume that our economy has both nominal and real rigidities
and the central bank sets its policy rule. In what follows, we are going to
describe in detail parts of the model that deviate from Smets and Wouters
(2007) setup, while all the remaining equations are reported in the online
Appendix.
2.1. Households
We assume that the representative household trades a risk-less one period
government bond and accumulates physical capital that it rents out to
rms. Moreover, it receives wage income and dividend payments from the
rms. Therefore, the representative household maximizes the following
utility function with two arguments, consumption (Ct) and labour (Lt):
maxEt
( 1X
t=0
t
" 
1
1 c (Ct   hCt 1)1 
c 
exp

c 1
1+l
(Lt)
1+l
 !#) (1)
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where t is the discount factor, c denotes the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion and l is the inverse of the elasticity of work with respect to the real
wage. The parameter h measures the degree of external habit formation in
consumption.
The representative household faces the following budget constraint:
Bt
"btRt
= Bt 1 + (1   lt)WtLt + (1   kt )Rkt +Dt   PtCt   PtIt + Tt (2)
where Pt indicates the price level while Rt is the gross nominal return of
government bonds denoted by Bt. As in Smets and Wouters (2007), "bt
is the exogenous risk premium shock and follows an AR(1) process. Wt
denotes the wage rate while Rkt is the rental rate and Dt are the rms div-
idends. Ct and It represent the private consumption good and investment
good, respectively. The scal authority absorbs part of the gross income
of the representative household to nance its expenditure. Accordingly, in
equation (2),  lt denotes the labour income tax rate while 
k
t is the cap-
ital income tax rate. Moreover, Tt indicates the lump-sum taxes of the
government.
In addition, the representative household supplies its labour services to
a labour union. The union uses Calvo (1983) contracts to set the wages
charged to the intermediate rms. Finally, we allow for a partial indexation
of wages to past ination rates.
2.2. Firms
We assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive rms indexed by
j 2 [0; 1] that produces di¤erentiated varieties of intermediate production
goods, and a single nal production good rm that combines the variety of
intermediate production goods under perfect competition.
Each intermediate good rm j produces its di¤erentiated output using
a Cobb-Douglas technology with three input factors: private capital (Kt),
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labour (Lt) and productive government capital (K
gp
t ):
Yt (j) = "
a
t (Kt (j))
1 (Lt (j))
2 (Kgpt (j))
3    (5)
where : 1 + 2 = 1
and : 0 < 3 < 1
where 1 and 2 indicate the private capital and labour share in production
respectively. With respect to the production function used by Smets and
Wouters (2007), equation (5) displays an additional parameter associated
with the productive government capital, that is 3. This parameter denotes
the public capital share in production.6 Moreover, in equation (5), "at
indicates the total factor productivity exogenous shock following a rst
order autoregressive process and  is a xed cost. Firms set their prices
according to current and expected marginal costs, but also according to
past ination rate. The expression for the marginal cost is di¤erent from
the one of Smets and Wouters (2007) since, in our case, marginal cost does
not depend only on wages and capital rental rate but also on the price of
the productive government capital (see online Appendix).
In line with Baxter and King (1993) and Leeper et al. (2010), we assume
that the evolution equation for productive government capital is given by:
Kgpt+1 (j) = (1  g)Kgpt (j) +G
p
t (6)
where g is the parameter indicating the depreciation rate of the productive
government capital. In equation (6), G
p
t indicates the productive govern-
ment investment.
We also assume that, in the intermediate production good sector, there
is a sluggish price adjustment due to staggered price contracts à la Calvo.
Finally, we allow for partial indexation of prices that cannot be adjusted
to past ination rates.
6In line with Baxter and King (1993), Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) and Leeper et
al. (2010), we model the production function in order to exhibit increasing returns to
scale with respect to public capital.
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2.3. Fiscal Sector
Government budget constraint assumes that the nance of public spending
takes place through lump-sum taxes, issuing bonds or adjusting distor-
tionary taxes on labour and capital income. We separate government ex-
penditure into productive (Gpt ) and unproductive (G
u
t ) and, consequently,
display a composite budget constraint as:
Gut +G
p
t +Bt 1 + Tt = 
r
t +
Bt
Rt
(7)
Moreover, total government tax revenues are given by:
 rt = (1   lt)W ht Lht + (1   kt )RktKt 1 (8)
We use scal policy rules that are in line with Leeper et al. (2010):
^ lt = 
yly^t + 
blb^t 1 + "^
l
t (9)
where : "^lt= 
l"^lt 1+
llt (10)
^ kt = 
yky^t + 
bkb^t 1 + "^
k
t (11)
where : "^kt= 
k"^kt 1+
k
k
t (12)
g^pt =  yg
p
y^t   bgp b^t 1 + "^gpt (13)
where : "^g
P
t = 
gp "^g
p
t 1+
gpg
p
t (14)
g^ut =  yg
u
y^t   bgu b^t 1 + "^gut (15)
where : "^g
u
t = 
gu "^g
u
t 1+
gu
gu
t (16)
t^t = 
yty^t + 
btb^t 1 (17)
where small hatted letters denote linearized variables. Moreover, "^lt, "^
k
t , "^
gp
t
and "^g
u
t are assumed to follow distinct AR(1) processes and each of the s is
distributed i.i.d. N (0,1). All our scal policy rules have two characteristics.
Firstly, we assume that the scal variables respond to contemporaneous
variations of output (yl  0, yk  0, ygp  0, ygu  0 and yt  0).
Secondly, our rules allow for dynamic responses to changes in government
debt (bl  0, bk  0, bgp  0, bgu  0 and bt  0). Moreover, in
order to capture the persistence in taxes and expenditures we allow for the
shocks to be serially correlated (l 2 [0; 1], k 2 [0; 1], gp 2 [0; 1] and gu 2
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[0; 1]). Finally, in order to capture unexpected changes in distortionary
taxes and spending we assume that scal rules (9), (11), (13) and (15)
include exogenous processes ("^lt, "^
k
t , "^
gp
t and "^
gu
t , respectively).
2.4. Monetary Policy
Following Smets and Wouters (2007), the central bank is assumed to set
the nominal interest rate according to the following Taylor rule (Taylor,
1993):
Rt
(r)SS
=

R 1t
(r)SS
 "
t
()SS
r 
Yt
Y p
ry#(1 )
Yt=Yt 1
Y pt =Y
p
t 1
ry
"rt (18)
where (r)SS and ()SS are the steady states of nominal interest rate and
ination, respectively. Moreover,  is the nominal interest smoothing para-
meter, r indicates the response of nominal interest rate to lagged ination
from an ination objective, ry denotes the response of nominal interest rate
to output gap and ry is the response of nominal interest rate to changes
in output gap. We also assume that the monetary policy shock is denoted
by "rt . Finally, Y
p
t indicates the natural output level.
2.5. Market Equilibrium
The nal goods market is in equilibrium if the production of rms equals
the demand by households for consumption and investment and the govern-
ment. Di¤erently from standard new Keynesian models, in the aggregate
resource constraint (19) we observe that total public spending is given by
the sum of productive and unproductive government expenditures:
Yt = Ct + It +G
u
t +G
p
t (19)
3. Estimated Results
In this section, rstly, we describe the data and the estimation technique
used in order to assess the theoretical model. Secondly, we discuss how we
estimate the endogenous parameters and the exogenous processes related
to the structural shocks. Finally, we present the main estimation results.
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3.1. Data and Estimation Technique
We estimate our model using US quarterly data for the sample period
1963:Q2-2013:Q4.7 The length of our sample relates to the data availabil-
ity of our main source, namely the OECD Economic Outlook No 90. In
turn, the reason of choosing such source relates to the disaggregation of US
government expenditure components that is crucial for our analysis as we
will explain below.
According to our theoretical set up, we consider eight exogenous shocks
so that eight data series are used in our estimation. In particular, we use
data on real gross domestic product, real private consumption, real private
investment, real wage compensation, ination rate, federal funds e¤ective
rate, real labour tax revenues, real capital tax revenues, real productive
government expenditure and real unproductive government spending. In
order to obtain the real variables we deate them using the US GDP dea-
tor. Moreover, the real variables are converted in per capita terms dividing
by the working age population. Following Pfeifer (2014) we also detrend
the logarithm of each real variable,8 while we demean the ination rate and
nominal interest rate. All the details about data construction are shown in
the online Appendix.
In what follows, we prefer to focus on the variables that are newwith
respect to previous DSGE analysis on this topic (see for example, Coenen
et al. 2012; Leeper et al. 2010), namely real productive and unproductive
government expenditures. As in Leeper et al. (2010) we focus on federal
government data for which comprehensive data on scal series exist. In
particular, the OECD Economic Outlook No 90 provides a detailed disag-
gregation of government expenditure components. As we explained above,
our aim is to disentangle between productive and unproductive government
spending following Kneller et al. (1999) approach. To this end we assume
that government productive expenditure is composed by government nal
wage consumption expenditure, government xed capital formation, capi-
tal transfers and other capital payments and government consumption of
scal capital. For the period 1960-2013, the average share of this series
7The period 1960:Q2-1963:Q1 is used as presample.
8In particular, we use the HP lter with smoothing parameter equal to 1,600.
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on US GDP is about the 17%. We further assume that the unproductive
government spending correspond to the sum of government nal non-wage
consumption expenditure, property income paid by government, subsidies
and social security benets paid by government. This series weights on
average about the 20% of US GDP during the period 1960-2013.
As we described above we detrend both these series likewise we treat
the remaining real variables. Although recent papers have used one or
two common stochastic trends to estimate DSGE models (see for example
Greenwood et al. 1997, 2000; Altig et al. 2005) this procedure is not
straightforward. Indeed, our choice is motivated by the fact that scal
series clearly display di¤erent trends during our sample period.9 Therefore,
following the treatment of observed variables used by Leeper et al. (2010)
we prefer to detrend the series of labour tax revenues, capital tax revenues,
productive government spending and unproductive government spending.
As estimation technique, we use the Bayesian approach. More speci-
cally, the estimation of the model parameters by Bayesian maximum like-
lihood proceeds in two steps. First, we specify prior distributions for the
parameters. Then we combine this prior information with the likelihood of
the model and characterise the posterior distribution. In order to approx-
imate the parameters posterior distribution, we use Markov Chain Monte
Carlo methods. Specically, we use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to
generate parameter observations on which to base inference.10
3.2. Fixed Parameters and Prior Distributions
Before discussing the estimation results we rstly describe the choice of the
prior distributions. Table 1 presents the values assigned to xed parame-
ters. These parameters can be viewed as very strict priors because they
can be directly related to the steady-state values and are not identiable
from the data we use. For these values we assume standardparameters
extracted from the most recent DSGE literature. In particular, the dis-
count factor () is calibrated to be 0.996, in line with the value assumed
9In the online Appendix, Figure C1 shows the series of labour and capital tax revenues
together with productive and unproductive government expenditures all expressed as
shares of GDP.
10All our estimations are done with Dynare (http://www.dynare.org/).
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Parameter Symbol Value Target/Source
Discount Factor  0:996 D & S (2008)
Depreciation Rate of Priv. Cap.  0:025 Ann. Cap. Depr: 0.10
Elast. Labour Supply l 0:04 Altonji (1986)
Public Cap. Share in Prod. 3 0:10 Leeper et al. (2010)
S.S. Mark-up in Goods Market p 1:5 S & W (2007)
S.S. Mark-up in Lab. Market w 1:5 S & W (2007)
Goods Market Agg. Cur. #p 10 S & W (2007)
Lab. Market Agg. Cur. #w 10 S & W (2007)
Prod. Gov. Exp. / GPD gpy 0:17 From our data sample
Unprod. Gov. Exp. / GPD guy 0:20 From our data sample
S.S. Capital Tax Rate
 
 k
SS
0:28 From our data sample
S.S. Labour Tax Rate
 
 l
SS
0:26 From our data sample
Depreciation Rate of Gov. Cap. g 0:005 Leeper et al. (2010)
Table 1: Fixed parameters according to quarterly data
by Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008).
The depreciation rate of private capital () is set at 0.025 per quarter,
which implies an annual depreciation on capital of 0.10. We set up the
elasticity of labour supply (l) equal to 0.04 in line with the broad range of
values that have been calculated on the basis of microeconomic or macro-
economic data sets.11 Moreover, we assume that 3 is equal to 0.10 which
is within the range applied in the related literature (see Leeper et al., 2010
and references therein).12
As in Smets andWouters (2007), the steady state mark-up in the labour
market (w) is equal to 1.5, and we assume that the steady state mark-up
in the goods market (p) is equal to 1.5 as well. Moreover, as in Smets
and Wouters (2007), the curvature parameters of the Kimball aggregators
in the goods (#p) and labour market, (#w), are both set at 10.
Di¤erently from Smets andWouters (2007) and Del Negro and Schorfheide
11As reported by Peterman (2016), original microeconometric estimates of the elastic-
ity of labour supply are between 0-0.54 (see MaCurdy, 1981; Altonji, 1986). In contrast,
other studies calibrate the elasticity of labour supply in macroeconomic models in the
range of 2-4 (Chetty et al., 2013).
12We would like to mention here that the parameter 3 is dicult to estimate due to
the absence of aggregate data. In addition, the related empirical literature on public
spending has diverse views on the share of public spending in the production ranging
from signicant 0.24 (Aschauer 1989) to insignicant Kamps (2004) or even negative
e¤ects (Evans and Karras, 1994).
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(2008) we have a set of xed parameters related to scal sector. In par-
ticular, the relative shares of productive (gpy) and unproductive (guy) gov-
ernment expenditures on GDP are computed as average ratios for the pe-
riod 1960-2013 and are equal to 0.17 and 0.20, respectively. Moreover,
the steady state tax rates for capital,
 
 k
ss
, and labour,
 
 l
ss
, are ob-
tained from average capital and labour income tax rates, respectively, and
computed from our sample data. Finally, as in Leeper et al. (2010) we
assume that the depreciation rate for the government capital expenditure
(g) corresponds to 0.005.13
Tables 2 and 3 report the remaining parameters of the model estimated
with Bayesian techniques.14 In particular, our prior mean for habit in con-
sumption (h) is in line with the values used by Jermann (1998) and Con-
stantinides (1990). We set the prior mean of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution ( 1
c
) corresponding to a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
equal to 5.15 Regarding the prior for the investment adjustment costs (S 00)
we set it in line with Ravn et al. (2012) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2012). The prior mean for the private capital share in the production
function (1) is set following Leeper et al. (2010) calibration.
Turning to nominal rigidities, we assume prior means for the parame-
ters of Calvo wage (w), Calvo price (p), wage indexation (w) and price
indexation (p) in line with Le et al. (2011).16 Regarding the parameters of
the monetary policy rule, the prior for the degree of interest rate smooth-
ing () is similar to the one used by Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008).
We assume that the priors for the long-run reaction coe¢ cients of ination
(r) and output (ry) are Gamma distributed with means equal to 4 and
2, respectively, and standard deviations of 0.25 and 0.10, respectively. In
addition, we set the prior of the short-run coe¢ cient of output (ry) as
Gamma distributed with mean 0.50 and standard deviation 0.10.
13This is also in line with the related literature, i.e. Baxter and King (1993) and
Kamps (2004).
14The prior and posterior probability density functions for all the estimated parame-
ters are shown in the online Appendix.
15This value of the risk aversion is commonly used in the macroeconomic literature
(see, for example, Jermann, 1998).
16In their study, Le et al. (2011) estimate a model of the US economy for the post-war
period, using indirect inference, the bootstrap and a VAR representation of the data.
They suggest that limited nominal rigidities t better with actual data.
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Focusing on the priors for the coe¢ cients of the scal sector we assume
rather loose priors in order to cover a large range of parameter values.
More specically, the prior for the parameter of the labour tax rate elas-
ticity with respect to output (yl) is assumed to have Gamma distribution
with a mean of 0.10 and standard deviation of 0.05 (so that it will range ap-
proximately between 0 and 0.35). We assume the same priors as in Leeper
et al. (2010) for the parameters of capital tax rate (yk) and lump-sum
tax (yt) elasticities with respect to output. Moreover, our assumed prior
distributions for the responses of labour income tax (bl), capital tax (bk)
and lump-sum tax (bt) to government debt cover a large range of possible
estimated values. In particular, bl will range approximately between 0 and
0.25, while bk between 0 and 5 and, nally, bt between 0 and 2.5.
As a contribution with respect to previous studies, we distinguish be-
tween two di¤erent types of government spending. Therefore, we assume
two distinct parameters that measure the responses of productive and un-
productive government expenditures to output, namely, yg
p
and yg
u
. As
far as we know, our study is the rst that attempts to estimate the value
for these parameters. Thus, our assumed prior distributions for yg
p
and
yg
u
are fairly general covering the range of values found by previous papers
that estimated the response of aggregate government spending to output
(see for example Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Giorno et al., 1995; Yang,
2005). Moreover, our model assumes two di¤erent parameters indicating
the responses of productive and unproductive government expenditures to
debt, i.e. bg
p
and bg
u
. Our analysis contributes to previous economic
literature in estimating these parameters. Also, in this case we assume dif-
fuse prior distributions in order to cover a reasonable range of parameter
values.17
Finally, we focus on the priors of the parameters related to the exoge-
nous processes driving the economy. As in Leeper et al. (2010), we set
the persistence parameters for AR(1) exogenous processes to be Beta dis-
tributed with mean 0.70 and standard deviation 0.20. Moreover, we use
Inverse Gamma distributions for standard errors of all exogenous shocks
17In this regard, our prior distributions cover the range of values found by Leeper et
al. (2010) that have estimated the response of aggregate government spending to the
debt to output ratio.
15
with means equal to one and innite degrees of freedom which correspond
to rather loose priors.
3.3. Posterior Estimates
In order to estimate the model we used a sample of 1,000,000 draws (drop-
ping the rst 250,000 draws), obtaining an acceptance rate of about 27%.
To test the stability of the sample, we used the Brooks and Gelman (1998)
diagnostic, which compares within and between moments of multiple chains.
Tables 2 and 3 show the posterior means for the model parameters together
with a 90% condence interval.
In the online Appendix we report several diagnostic tests for our es-
timates, including the Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) univariate
diagnostics and the multivariate convergence diagnostics. Moreover, in or-
der to evaluate whether our estimated model ts with the US economy,
we computed the business cycle statistics implied by our model and com-
pared them with those deriving from actual data. The results show that
our estimated model well captures the business cycle statistics of the key
variables.
Our estimate of the external habit stock is about 80% of past consump-
tion, while the posterior mean estimate for the inverse coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion is 0.2, though it is not well identied by the data. The pos-
terior mean estimate for S
00
is higher than its prior mean suggesting an
even slower response of investment to changes in the value of capital. Our
estimate of 1 is 0.28 which corresponds to a share of about 2/3 of labour
to output.
In terms of nominal rigidities, the posterior mean estimates suggest that
both prices and wages are exible being changed roughly every four months
on average. Moreover, the posterior estimates suggest that the degree of
indexation of both prices and wages is low.
Focusing on our estimates of the monetary policy reaction function, the
posterior mean of the reaction coe¢ cient to ination is estimated to be
substantially high. Moreover, the nominal interest rate appears to react
very strongly to the output gap in the long-run, but does not respond
strongly to changes in the output gap in the short-run. Finally, the degree
16
Par. Description Priors Posteriors
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mean Conf. Inter.
h Cons. Habit Pers. B 0.85 0.01 0.81 0.79 0.82
1
c
Intertemporal Elas. of Sub. G 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.12 0.28
S
00
Inv. Adjustment Cost G 7.00 1.50 15.53 12.87 18.11
1 Private Cap. Share in Prod. G 0.35 0.02 0.28 0.26 0.30
w Calvo Wages Prob. B 0.20 0.01 0.23 0.21 0.24
p Calvo Prices Prob. B 0.20 0.01 0.24 0.23 0.26
w Degree of Wage Ind. B 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.07
p Degree of Price Ind. B 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07
 Int. Rate Smooth. in T.R. G 0.60 0.01 0.64 0.62 0.66
r T.R. Coef. on Inf. G 4.00 0.25 3.62 3.27 3.96
ry T.R. L.R. Coef. on Output G 2.00 0.10 1.68 1.54 1.82
ry T.R. S.R. Coef. on Output G 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.14 0.26
yl Lab. Inc. Tax / GDP Coef. G 0.10 0.05 0.25 0.07 0.43
yk Cap. Tax / GDP Coef. G 1.00 0.30 2.97 2.33 3.62
yt Lump-sum Tax / GDP Coef. G 0.20 0.10 0.23 0.05 0.41
bl Lab. Inc. Tax / Debt Coef. G 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.15
bk Cap. Tax / Debt Coef. G 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.00 1.21
bt Lump-sum Tax / Debt Coef. G 0.60 0.40 1.17 0.29 2.04
yg
p
Prod. Gov. Exp. / GDP Coef. G 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.26
yg
u
Unprod. Gov. Exp. / GDP Coef. G 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.23
bg
p
Prod. Gov. Exp. / Debt Coef. G 0.40 0.20 0.24 0.06 0.42
bg
u
Unprod. Gov. Exp. / Debt Coef. G 0.40 0.20 0.34 0.07 0.60
Table 2: Priors and posteriors for the endogenous parameters
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of interest rate smoothing is slightly higher than its prior mean.
Turning to the estimates of the scal policy parameters, we observe
that capital tax response is much more procyclical than labour tax re-
sponse. Similarly, capital tax responds more strongly than labour tax to
changes in government debt. This is in line with the optimal scal pol-
icy literature that suggests that capital taxes should be used as a shock
absorber while labour taxes should be held relatively smooth over the busi-
ness cycle (Barro, 1979, Chari et al., 1994 and Angelopoulos et al., 2015).
In addition, we found that lump-sum taxes respond strongly in changes to
debt to output ratio, while they have low response to output deviations.
As a result the estimated scal rules show a preference of towards the use
of non-distortionary taxation to stabilise debt, while capital tax is the most
reactive scal policy instrument for output stabilisation.
Focusing on the two di¤erent types of government expenditures, our
estimated results show that both productive and unproductive government
spending have similar responses to changes in output. However, the un-
productive government expenditure responds more strongly than produc-
tive government spending to debt variations. In this regards, our results
contribute to previous economic literature by convincingly quantifying the
economic e¤ects of the alternative methods of nancing public expendi-
ture.18
Finally, regarding the exogenous processes, with the exceptions of the
risk premium shock, the investment shock and the wage mark-up shock, all
the posterior estimates show a higher persistence than the one assumed in
the prior distribution. In particular, our results show that the unproductive
government spending is more persistent than the productive government
expenditure. Moreover, our posterior estimates show that capital tax shock,
unproductive government spending shock and labour tax shock are much
more volatile than the remaining shocks.
18In this regard, Lorusso and Pieroni (2017) and Barro (1979 and 1981) have stressed
the importance of the economic e¤ects of government spending and its alternative -
nancing methods. In particular, Lorusso and Pieroni (2017) have focused on di¤erent
public spending components, namely civilian and military expenditures.
18
Parameter Priors Posteriors
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mean Conf. Inter.
Risk Premium Pers.: b B 0.70 0.20 0.05 0.01 0.09
Investment Pers.: i B 0.70 0.20 0.65 0.55 0.75
Wage Mark-up Pers.: w B 0.70 0.20 0.10 0.04 0.16
Price Mark-up Pers.: p B 0.70 0.20 0.75 0.61 0.90
Productivity Pers.: a B 0.70 0.20 0.95 0.90 0.99
Productive Gov. Exp. Pers.: g
p
B 0.70 0.20 0.84 0.76 0.92
Unproductive Gov. Exp. Pers.: g
u
B 0.70 0.20 0.99 0.98 0.99
Capital Tax Pers.: k B 0.70 0.20 0.79 0.72 0.86
Labour Income Tax Pers.: l B 0.70 0.20 0.74 0.68 0.80
Monetary Policy Pers.: r B 0.70 0.20 0.88 0.83 0.92
Risk Premium St. Err.: b I-G 1 Inf 0.33 0.30 0.36
Investment St. Err.: i I-G 1 Inf 0.52 0.42 0.60
Wage Mark-up St. Err.: w I-G 1 Inf 1.03 0.91 1.15
Price Mark-up St. Err.: p I-G 1 Inf 0.24 0.19 0.28
Productivity St. Err.: a I-G 1 Inf 0.30 0.21 0.39
Productive Gov. Exp. St. Err.: g
p
I-G 1 Inf 0.82 0.67 0.98
Unproductive Gov. Exp. St. Err.: g
u
I-G 1 Inf 2.82 2.55 3.08
Capital Tax St. Err.: k I-G 1 Inf 4.22 3.86 4.60
Labour Income Tax St. Err.: l I-G 1 Inf 2.45 2.24 2.67
Monetary Policy St. Err.: r I-G 1 Inf 0.43 0.38 0.49
Table 3: Priors and posteriors for the shock processes parameters
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4. Impulse Response Analysis
This section presents the impulse responses of the key variables in our
economy following an exogenous positive 1% shock to productive and un-
productive government spending.19 For the impulse response analysis, we
set the values of the estimated parameters equal to their mean estimates
of the posterior distribution. Moreover, in Figures 1 and 2 we include two
lines: i) the solid line that represents an economy with price rigidities; ii)
the dashed line that denotes the exible economy.
4.1. Productive Government Expenditure
As we can observe from Figure 1, in response to the shock, output increases
on impact and in the subsequent periods in both economies. In addition,
debt increases because it is assumed to be the residual instrument for the
government and due to the fact that the increase of the remaining scal
instruments, that follow a predetermined rule, is not su¢ cient to fund the
exogenous increase in public spending. As a result, the increased public
spending does not increase debt on a one-to-one basis. In particular, all
taxes increase due to their estimated positive reaction to current output
gap and past debt to output gap, even though they increase at a di¤erent
rate and with di¤erent patterns.20 Moreover, unproductive government
spending drops because the unproductive spending shock is assumed to be
zero and, according to expression (15), g^ut depends exclusively on counter-
cyclical reactions to output and debt.
Private consumption behaves di¤erently for the rigid and the exible
economy. The driving force of this result is the reaction of the wage rate.
In particular, the increase in the real wage occurs when the shift in labour
demand dominates the shift in labour supply. Under both economies, the
increased productive government spending will increase the productivity
of rms due to the assumption that productive public spending enters in
19Note that qualitatively the results of the impulse response analysis are the same
if we use the estimated standard deviation of the shocks instead of the one percent
standard deviation. We simply normalise the shock to the economy to be one percent to
ease the comparison of the impulse responses between the two cases of productive and
unproductive government spending.
20Each scal rule response to output and debt has been estimated and exhibits di¤er-
ent values.
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the rmsproduction function. This, in turn, will lead to higher labour
demand. In addition, in the rigid economy, under sticky prices à la Calvo,
rms that cannot change their price will adjust quantities, hence further
shifting labour demand at a given wage. On the other hand, the remaining
rms increase their prices, creating ination. Moreover, under the rigid
economy, rms prices over marginal cost decrease leading to an additional
upward pressure on prices.21 Meanwhile, the change in labour supply de-
pends on the wealth e¤ect and the intertemporal substitution. In this
case, the low persistence of the productive government spending reduces
the present discounted value of taxes and the wealth e¤ect on consumers.
Therefore, in the rigid economy, the stronger shift of labour demand
compared to labour supply and the high ination lead to an increase in
wage rates. This is su¢ cient to create a positive reaction of private con-
sumption for almost eight quarters. In this regard, our results are in line
with the ndings of Linnemann and Schabert (2003) and Ravn et al. (2006)
showing that strong shifts in labour demand and counter-cyclical markups
of prices over marginal cost may imply a positive reaction of private con-
sumption under an exogenous increase in productive public spending. On
the contrary, under the exible economy, private consumption decreases.
This is the standard neoclassical result where the wealth e¤ect dominates
leading to high labour supply and lower consumption due to the expected
future taxation that will fund the increase in public spending (see, among
others, Barro, 1990).
[Figure 1 about here]
4.2. Unproductive Government Expenditure
As we can see from Figure 2, following the shock, the reactions of output
and debt are again positive. In addition, the initial reaction of all the
scal instruments is similar to the productive public spending. However,
we should note here that unproductive public spending exhibits higher
persistence compared to the productive public spending. This causes a
21The ratio of price over marginal cost decreases following the exogenous shock be-
cause, as it can be seen from the impulse responses, marginal cost increases more than
ination.
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di¤erent reaction of the economy and, in particular, of the scal rules.
For example, in this case the labour, capital and lump-sum taxes need to
remain high, or keep increasing over time (for the case of the lump-sum
taxes), due to the high persistence of the shock. Even though the lump-
sum taxes increase over time, they are not su¢ cient to control debt so as
not to increase. In particular, the response of debt is twice as much as in
the case of productive spending. As a result, the economy enters a spiral of
higher level of output but also high level of debt for a prolonged period of
time. This implies a signicant crowding-out e¤ect on private consumption
because the persistent high taxes cause a signicant negative wealth e¤ect
on consumers.
Comparing the reaction of private consumption to the case with a pos-
itive shock to productive public spending, we observe that even in the case
of a rigid economy we cannot get the empirically relevant positive reaction
of private consumption. Therefore, the assumption of price stickiness is not
su¢ cient to drive the crowding-in e¤ect on private consumption from an in-
crease in public spending. In particular, positive unproductive government
spending shocks do not increase rmsproductivity. As a consequence, the
shift in labour demand is lower than in the case of the productive public
spending shock. Accordingly, the response of real wage is negative inducing
a crowding-out e¤ect on consumption.
Our results are in line with Linnemann and Schabert (2003) that argue
that price rigidities alone are not su¢ cient to generate a positive reaction in
private consumption following a positive public spending shock. Moreover,
we extend the argument of Ravn et al. (2006) where they implemented
a model with price rigidities and deep habits to replicate the empirically
relevant positive reaction of private consumption. They also show that the
same model with supercial habits, like in our model, cannot produce
the same results. Our model shows that price rigidities with productive
public spending is the combination that leads to a positive reaction in
private consumption when the exogenous positive government shock is on
the productive public spending.
In the next section we show the importance of public spending nancing
under a rigid and a exible economy.
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[Figure 2 about here]
5. Fiscal Multipliers
In this section we summarise the e¤ects of the two types of public spending
to the economy. The present value multipliers are constructed following
Leeper et al. (2010) and using the following equation:
kX
i=0
 
iY
j=0
r 1t+j
!
Xt+i
kX
i=0
 
iY
j=0
r 1t+j
!
Gct+i
(20)
where Xt+i, in the tables below, represents output (Yt+i) and private con-
sumption (Ct+i). Moreover, we assess the e¤ects of both categories of
public spending. Thus, Gct+i denes productive (G
p
t+i) and unproductive
public spending (Gut+i). In addition, Xt+i and G
c
t+i are the relative level
changes of the variables with respect to their steady-state values. Finally,
the discount factor (r) represents the real interest rate.
Table 4 presents the cumulative present value multipliers for output and
consumption based on the mean estimates of the posterior distribution.
The parameter k determines the period in quarters and is set up to 1,000
for the innite horizon case. We also present the results on the impact of
the exogenous shock, together with the results for 3, 5 and 10 years ahead.
Comparing the present value of output multipliers between the rigid
and the exible economy we can see that they are slightly higher at the
rigid economy and both are close to the range of values reported in previous
empirical studies (Monacelli and Perotti, 2008 and Romer and Bernstein,
2009).
Regarding consumption present value multipliers for the rigid economy
we can see that it is positive for at least 5 years indicating that the initial
positive reaction of private consumption observed at the impulse responses
is rather long lasting.22 In terms of exible economy, we note that the in-
22The consumption present value multiplier under the productive public spending
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Variable Impact 1-year 3-years 5-years 10-years 1
Rigid Economy
Productive Government Spending Present Value Multipliers
Yt+i
Gpt+i
1.018 0.959 0.846 0.764 0.627 0.442
Ct+i
Gpt+i
0.074 0.082 0.058 0.024 -0.066 -0.234
Unproductive Government Spending Present Value Multipliers
Yt+i
Gut+i
0.962 0.913 0.848 0.807 0.745 0.550
Ct+i
Gut+i
0.003 -0.014 -0.040 -0.060 -0.101 -0.280
Flexible Economy
Productive Government Spending Present Value Multipliers
Y ft+i
Gpt+i
0.909 0.810 0.681 0.600 0.483 0.358
Cft+i
Gpt+i
-0.038 -0.074 -0.123 -0.160 -0.237 -0.347
Unproductive Government Spending Present Value Multipliers
Y ft+i
Gut+i
0.920 0.851 0.769 0.721 0.652 0.464
Cft+i
Gut+i
-0.039 -0.074 -0.118 -0.147 -0.196 -0.369
Table 4: Present value multipliers for output and consumption
under productive and unproductive government spending shock
stantaneous consumption multiplier assumes a slightly positive value. In-
deed, real rigidities prevent consumption from adjusting immediately, as
we observed in Figure 1. However, immediately after the impact of the
shock the present value of the consumption multiplier becomes negative
and constantly decreases.
In order to assess if the method of nancing the increased level of spend-
ing matters for the positive reaction of consumption, we consider di¤erent
nancing methods. Table 5 presents the cumulative present value multi-
pliers for output and consumption for two di¤erent cases. The left panel
presents the case where only labour and capital taxes adjust to the ex-
ogenous public spending shock, whereas the right panel presents the case
where only lump-sum taxes adjust.
Overall, we do not observe signicant di¤erences in the short-run re-
garding the di¤erent methods of nancing. However, in the long-run it
matters signicantly whether the government uses distortionary (such as
shock is equal to zero six and a half years after the shock and it then turns negative.
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labour and capital taxes) or non-distortionary (such as lump-sum taxes)
methods of nancing. This result is in line with the ndings of Leeper et
al. (2010) arguing that distortionary taxation creates an additional chan-
nel that negatively a¤ects the expansionary implications of increased public
spending.
Regarding the exible economy, for both productive and unproductive
expenditures we note that the present value output multipliers are con-
stantly higher when only lump-sum taxes adjust to a positive spending
shock. On the other hand, under the rigid economy case, output multipli-
ers have very similar responses in the short-run with much more pronounced
di¤erences in the long-run. Specically, in the long-run the present value
output multipliers are positive in the case of lump-sum tax adjustment.
Turning to the present value of consumption multipliers, under the exi-
ble economy case, we observe signicantly negative values when only labour
and capital taxes adjust to positive productive and unproductive spending
shocks. On the contrary, under the rigid economy case, the di¤erences
between the two methods of nancing are less pronounced.
In general, we observe that di¤erent nancing methods have distinct
e¤ects on output and private consumption depending on whether the econ-
omy is rigid or exible. More specically, when prices are sticky the stronger
change in labour supply compared to labour demand and the high ination
level induce a positive response of real wage. The last e¤ect is absent in
the exible economy case.
Finally, our results also indicate that private consumption immediately
increases when productive public spending rises irrespective the method of
debt nancing. This outcome is in contrast to Linnemann and Schabert
(2006) where they argue that only under non-distortionary taxation as a
method of nancing may lead to a crowding-in private consumption. In
this regard, our results extend signicantly the work of Linnemann and
Schabert (2006) since we consider di¤erent scal policy rules including those
for capital and labour taxes.
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Variable Impact 5-years 1 Impact 5-years 1
Rigid Economy
Labour and Capital Taxes Adjust Lump-sum Taxes Adjust
Productive Government Spending Present Value Multipliers
Yt+i
Gpt+i
1.024 0.804 -1.583 1.022 0.804 0.420
Ct+i
Gpt+i
0.060 0.009 -1.643 0.054 -0.036 -0.376
Unproductive Government Spending Present Value Multipliers
Yt+i
Gut+i
0.969 0.848 -1.362 0.972 0.891 0.866
Ct+i
Gut+i
-0.013 -0.059 -1.563 -0.025 -0.104 -0.136
Flexible Economy
Labour and Capital Taxes Adjust Lump-sum Taxes Adjust
Productive Government Spending Present Value Multipliers
Y ft+i
Gpt+i
0.924 0.602 -3.380 0.938 0.713 0.382
Cft+i
Gpt+i
-0.039 -0.202 -3.357 -0.030 -0.140 -0.432
Unproductive Government Spending Present Value Multipliers
Y ft+i
Gut+i
0.938 0.717 -3.130 0.966 0.889 0.866
Cft+i
Gut+i
-0.039 -0.173 -3.223 -0.031 -0.106 -0.136
Table 5: Present value multipliers for output and consumption
under productive and unproductive government spending shock
when only distortive taxes adjust and when only lump-sum taxes
adjust
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6. Robustness Checks
In this section we provide a sensitivity analysis regarding the importance
of a few key parameters in our model. Starting with the share of the
productive public capital in the production process, 3, we examine how
our key results are a¤ected if we reduce its value to 0.05. Note that there is
no consensus regarding the value of this parameter in the related literature
with a suggested range of values between 0.05 and 0.24 (see Leeper et al.
2010 and references therein).
Table 6 shows that when the share of public capital in the production
process is reduced all the present value multipliers are lower and for every
period examined (middle panel). This result is valid for both economies
and for both types of public spending shocks. However, we should note
here that the present value multiplier of output and consumption is mainly
a¤ected under the rigid economy and under a positive shock to productive
public spending.
Regarding the speed of adjustment of the various scal rules (j pa-
rameter, where j = bl; bk; bgp; bgu and bt), we assess the e¤ects to our
economy when all the rules adjust twice as fast in each shock compared
to the benchmark case (right panel in Table 6). The results indicate that
under the rigid economy there are higher present value multipliers for out-
put and consumption, especially in the short-run. Therefore, in our model
the economy benets more in the short-run when the government does not
postpone the repayment of debt leading to a lower negative wealth e¤ect.
Monetary policy is one of the most important transmission channels of
public spending shocks. Therefore, in Table 7 we consider di¤erent values
for the parameters of the Taylor rule. In particular, we analyse output and
consumption multipliers when r, , ry and ry are set to the half of their
respective estimated values. In general, we observe that productive and
unproductive spending shocks produce similar qualitative results. A less
aggressive monetary policy implies lower nominal and real interest rate
weakening consumers incentives to postpone consumption and, in turn,
boosts nal output.
Thus, for example, lower values of r and ry cause higher values for the
instantaneous output and consumption multipliers. Similarly, in the long-
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Var. Imp. 5-years 1 Imp. 5-years 1 Imp. 5-years 1
Rigid Economy
Benchmark 3= 0:05 jnew = 2  j
Productive Government Spending Present Value Multipliers
Yt+i
Gpt+i
1.018 0.764 0.442 1.009 0.732 0.340 1.034 0.763 0.453
Ct+i
Gpt+i
0.074 0.024 -0.234 0.075 0.024 -0.309 0.089 0.036 -0.225
Unproductive Government Spending Present Value Multipliers
Yt+i
Gut+i
0.962 0.807 0.550 0.958 0.796 0.555 0.979 0.808 0.555
Ct+i
Gut+i
0.003 -0.060 -0.280 0.004 -0.059 -0.266 0.019 -0.050 -0.276
Flexible Economy
Benchmark 3= 0:05 jnew = 2  j
Productive Government Spending Present Value Multipliers
Y ft+i
Gpt+i
0.909 0.600 0.358 0.902 0.577 0.261 0.910 0.590 0.369
Cft+i
Gpt+i
-0.038 -0.160 -0.347 -0.038 -0.161 -0.424 -0.038 -0.158 -0.339
Unproductive Government Spending Present Value Multipliers
Y ft+i
Gut+i
0.920 0.721 0.464 0.916 0.713 0.472 0.921 0.712 0.469
Cft+i
Gut+i
-0.039 -0.147 -0.369 -0.038 -0.145 -0.356 -0.039 -0.147 -0.366
Table 6: Present value multipliers for output and consumption
under productive and unproductive government spending shock
with di¤erent share of productive capital in the production pro-
duction process and faster debt adjustment for the scal rules
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run, the present values of output and consumption multipliers are larger
than in the benchmark case. On the contrary, a lower value of the interest
rate smoothing parameter causes a higher response of the nominal interest
rate. Therefore, in this case, we observe a lower response of output and
consumption multipliers on impact and in the long-run. Finally, we note
that output and consumption multipliers are not substantially di¤erent
if we decrease ry to half of its benchmark value. Evidently, this result
depends on the low benchmark (estimated) value of the weight on short-
run GDP in the Taylor rule.
Variable
Rigid Economy Productive Gov. Spend. Unproductive Gov. Spend.
PV Multipliers PV Multipliers
Yt+i
Gpt+i
Ct+i
Gpt+i
Yt+i
Gpt+i
Ct+i
Gpt+i
Impact 1.018 0.074 0.962 0.003
5-years Benchmark 0.764 0.024 0.807 -0.060
1 0.442 -0.234 0.550 -0.280
Impact 1.048 0.105 0.966 0.007
5-years rnew = 0:5  r 0.800 0.066 0.810 -0.056
1 0.465 -0.205 0.547 -0.283
Impact 0.982 0.036 0.950 -0.009
5-years new = 0:5   0.739 -0.005 0.805 -0.063
1 0.434 -0.247 0.550 -0.280
Impact 1.022 0.078 0.962 0.003
5-years rynew = 0:5  ry 0.778 0.039 0.807 -0.060
1 0.451 -0.223 0.551 -0.279
Impact 1.020 0.076 0.962 0.003
5-years r
y
new = 0:5  ry 0.765 0.026 0.808 -0.060
1 0.442 -0.234 0.550 -0.280
Table 7: Present value multipliers for output and consumption
under productive and unproductive government spending shock
for the rigid economy with di¤erent values of the parameters in
Taylor rule
7. Conclusion
In this paper we developed and estimated a new Keynesian DSGE model
with productive and unproductive government spending nanced by lump-
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sum and distortive taxes. In particular, we have assumed that the produc-
tive government expenditure enters rmsproduction function. We have
also taken into account several scal policy rules. Our model has been es-
timated with Bayesian techniques for the sample period 1963:Q2-2013:Q4.
Our results contribute to the related literature in several ways. Firstly,
our estimated scal rules show that capital tax response is more procycli-
cal than labour tax response. Similarly, capital tax responds more strongly
than labour tax to changes in government debt. Thus, capital tax is used as
a shock absorber while labour tax is held relatively smooth over the business
cycle. Secondly, we found that lump-sum taxes exhibit a strong reaction to
changes in debt to output ratio. Thirdly, our estimates show that unpro-
ductive expenditure responds more strongly than productive spending to
changes in government debt indicating that policymakers are reluctant in
raising taxes to nance unpopularpublic spending. Therefore, they pre-
fer to issue new debt. Finally, we found that the estimated parameter for
the persistence of the unproductive spending shock is higher than the one
of productive expenditure. As we have shown, a lower persistence in the
productive public spending is one of the main reasons for the crowding-in
e¤ect on private consumption.
Moreover, our approach allowed us to assess several scal policy ex-
periments. In particular, our results show that when the share of public
capital in the production process is reduced all the present value multipliers
decrease. In addition, we found that for the rigid economy when all the
scal rules adjust more rapidly to debt deviations than in the estimated
case there are marginally higher present value multipliers for output and
consumption in the short-run. Finally, our ndings suggest that a less
aggressive monetary policy implies lower nominal and real interest rate
weakening consumers incentives to postpone consumption and, in turn,
leads to higher GDP.
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